If you were struck with a feeling of déjà vu by the Syria ceasefire deal, you weren't the only one.
News that Western and Russian leaders had agreed to implement a "cessation of hostilities" in Syria in the days to come reminded a lot of people familiar with President Vladimir Putin's modus operandi of another peace deal Russia proposed in a country where it's also a major belligerent: Ukraine.
Ukrainians, especially, were quick to pick up on the similarities between the two ceasefire deals.
"Uh-oh. Be worried," tweeted Olexander Scherba, Ukraine's ambassador to Austria.
#Russua suggested ceazefire in #Syria? Uh-oh. Be worried. Be very worried.— olexander scherba (@olex_scherba) February 11, 2016
"Identical to Ukraine," wrote Serhiy Kiral, a member of the Ukrainian parliament.
#Russia gained another "#Minsk" over #Syria identical to #Ukraine one. Who's next? Parts of Baltic countries, Turkey https://t.co/IZN1uQOCdR— Serhiy Kiral (@serhiykiral) February 12, 2016
In fact, it was exactly one year and one day ago, on Feb. 11, 2015, that leaders from Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany hammered out a truce to stop the violence in eastern Ukraine that had at the time killed more than 8,000 people. (The death toll is now more than 9,000, and counting.) A previous ceasefire deal in September 2014 had collapsed mere days after it was signed.
Like Western and Russian officials did in Munich Thursday, negotiators involved in the Ukraine deal last year haggled through the night and into morning until Moscow got what it wanted.
What Moscow wanted in Ukraine -- and what it also got in Munich -- was an agreement to delay the start of the ceasefire. The guns wouldn't fall silent the same day, but in a few days time. That allowed Russia to make critical gains on the battlefield and turn the tide of the war in its favor.
It was a decision that proved embarrassing for Kiev and its Western backers, and devastating for Ukraine's troops and residents in the country's east.
The guns did not fall silent. Instead, Russian soldiers tightened the noose around Debaltseve, a strategic transit hub linking the separatist strongholds of Donetsk and Luhansk. Then, when the town was virtually encircled, Russian battle tanks and rockets with names like "hail" and "hurricane" wiped out hundreds of Ukrainian troops, obliterating their hilltop position.
The Debaltseve offensive also destroyed much of the town itself and killed scores of civilians who tried to hunker down in their homes or flee the only way they could -- through a gauntlet of gunfire on an exposed two-lane stretch of highway known as "the road of life" with an overpass that had already been blown up twice.
The current situation in Aleppo, Syria's largest city, is remarkably similar to that in Debaltseve before the siege. The Syrian army, backed by Russian airstrikes and Iranian militiamen, has virtually surrounded Aleppo after cutting off a vital rebel supply route from Turkey.
Despite the Syria ceasefire, which is supposed to begin within a week, all signs point to the offensive continuing. It was still underway on Friday, with dozens of Russian airstrikes hitting neighborhoods around the city, according to Syria Civil Defense, a volunteer search and rescue group.
12/2/16. 35+ air strikes targeted the Homs countryside by Ru & SAA helos. 17 killed, incl Ussama Alkhateeb SCD volunteer. #ceasefire now— The White Helmets (@SyriaCivilDef) February 12, 2016
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad even said -- mere hours after the news of the ceasefire -- that he wouldn't stop the push, vowing to retake the whole of Syria in an interview with the AFP news agency.
Putin's Ukraine-Syria model: 1) gain a winning military hand 2) offer a bad political deal for a ceasefire 3) ignore the ceasefire— Jackson Diehl (@JacksonDiehl) February 11, 2016
Putin's politics
It's not just military strategy; Putin's political goals in Syria, too, appear to be the same as in Ukraine.
There, Putin wanted to shore up the pro-Russian separatists "people's republics" of Donetsk and Luhansk to ensure Moscow retained its influence over Kiev and had a card to play in future negotiations with the U.S. and European Union.
In Syria, Putin wants to bolster the regime of Assad and forestall Western attempts to force him from power as part of a peace deal. And in doing so, force the West to respect Russia and its interests while maintaining (or even expanding) its foothold in the Middle East.
Asked about Putin's negotiating strategies, Igor Sutyagin, a military analyst at the London-based Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), described the Russian president as "a three-headed dragon."
"This allows him to present himself in different ways in different situations," Sutyagin said. As a three-headed dragon, Putin "can be the bad dragon, the good dragon or an insane one."